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Abstract 
 
Historical asset price ‘bubbles’ are often attributed to mispricing, but the empirical analysis 
of such episodes has been limited. This paper examines a notable but academically neglected 
period, known as the British Railway Mania, using a new dataset and a cross-sectional 
methodology which is unique to the study of historical asset price reversals. The main finding 
is that the cross-sectional variation in stock prices, in every week of the sample, is explained 
by the cross-sectional variation in dividends, growth and risk, with no significant differences 
between railways and non-railways. This implies that an economic bubble was not 
responsible for the rise and fall in the prices of railway stocks at this time. (JEL G01, G11, 
G12, N23) 
 
 
 
* Correspondence to: Gareth Campbell, Queen’s University Management School, Queen's 
University Belfast, Belfast, BT7 1NN. Telephone: +44 28 9097 1368. Email: 
gareth.campbell@qub.ac.uk. With thanks to John Turner, Donal McKillop, Michael Moore, 
Kaddour Hadri, Fabio Braggion, Gerhard Kling, Peter Dunne, Michael Goldstein, and 
participants at the Economic History Society Annual Conference for their helpful comments. 
 
 2 
 
Asset price reversals have been a feature of financial markets for many centuries, with 
periods such as the Tulip Mania, the South Sea Bubble, and the Wall Street Crash being 
prominent examples. The ‘Dot-Com Bubble’ and ‘Housing Bubble’ have led to a renewed 
interest in such episodes, with popular commentary often associating them with irrationality 
and mispricing. The British Railway Mania of the 1840s has been amongst those periods 
which have attracted recent attention, with the Economist (2008) referring to it as ‘arguably 
the greatest bubble in history’. 
This paper argues that an analysis of the British Railway Mania rejects the hypothesis that an 
economic bubble existed during this period. Although the Railway Mania may have been a 
bubble in the popular sense of the word, in that there was a substantial rise and fall in stock 
prices, it was not a bubble in the economic sense. Railway assets did not have a significantly 
higher price than non-railway assets, even at the market peak, after controlling for 
fundamental factors such as dividends, growth, and risk. 
A new dataset has been collected from primary sources for this analysis, and a unique 
approach to the study of historical asset price reversals has been used, with a focus on the 
cross-sectional variation between different assets. This new dataset consists of weekly stock 
price and dividend data for every railway that was listed and operating during this period, and 
a sample of non-railway companies. The extent of the data collection has produced a sample 
size which enables a greater depth of analysis than has been possible in the study of most 
other historical ‘bubble’ episodes. 
The focus of the paper is on a series of 417 cross-sectional regressions, one for each week of 
the period between 1843 and 1850, relating the cross-sectional variation in stock prices to the 
variation in dividends, growth and risk. A dummy variable distinguishes the differences 
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between railway stocks, which experienced a substantial price reversal, and non-railway 
assets, which did not. The results suggest that the cross-sectional variation in dividends had a 
significant relationship with the cross-sectional variation in stock prices throughout the 
sample. There is also an indication that there was a significant relationship between prices 
and dividend growth during most of the period, as companies with a relatively high share 
price generally went on to experience higher dividend growth.  
When controlling for just current dividends and risk factors, the railways had significantly 
higher share prices than non-railways for between 31 and 110 weeks, depending on the 
functional form used. However, when several periods of future growth are also controlled for, 
the railways did not have a significantly higher price than the non-railways in any week of the 
sample period. These results imply that the prices of railway shares were determined by 
fundamental factors such as dividends, growth and risk throughout the period known as the 
Railway Mania, and that an economic bubble was not the reason for railway share price 
changes. 
This paper contributes to our knowledge of the British Railway Mania specifically, to our 
understanding of historical asset price reversals in general, and to the debate regarding the 
identification of bubbles. The analysis in this paper expands our knowledge of an important 
period which has received little attention from academic economists, and provides 
econometric evidence against the argument of Odlyzko (2010) that the Railway Mania was 
driven by ‘collective hallucinations and inefficient markets’.  
More generally, the results provide further evidence against arguments that some historical 
asset price changes may have been due to irrationality (Dale et al., 2005). The conclusion that 
an economic bubble was not responsible for substantial price changes is consistent with 
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research on the Tulip Mania of 1636 (Garber, 2001), the German stock market boom of 1927 
(Voth, 2003), the Wall Street boom of the late 1920s (Donaldson and Kamstra, 1996), and the 
Nasdaq bull market of the 1990s (Pástor and Veronesi, 2006). 
The use of a new methodology for studying historical episodes, which focuses on the cross-
sectional variation in assets, illustrates that sustained time series price increases may be 
explained by changes in fundamental factors, rather than a bubble component. The evidence 
of consistency in cross-sectional pricing confirms that time series changes are not a 
conclusive indication of irrationality, and the importance of future growth illustrates the 
difficulty in detecting mispricing ex-ante. The results also suggest that a subsequent fall in 
prices may be due to a previously unexpected deterioration in fundamentals, and the finding 
that railway assets were not obviously mispriced at their peak implies that it may be difficult 
to forecast market crashes. This supports the argument of Bernanke (2002, 2010) and 
Mishkin (2008) that it is difficult to predict substantial price declines ex-ante. 
This paper is organised as follows. Section 1 examines the related literature on the detection 
of bubbles, Section 2 provides a brief background to the Railway Mania, Section 3 discusses 
the data used, whilst Section 4 estimates the movement in stock prices and dividends during 
this period. Section 5 considers a panel cointegration analysis, Section 6 examines the cross-
sectional relationship between stock prices, current dividends, and risk, Section 7 extends this 
analysis to account for dividend growth, Section 8 discusses robustness checks, with Section 
9 being a brief conclusion.  
1 Detecting Bubbles 
As noted by O’Hara (2008), there has been some ambiguity about the meaning of the term 
‘bubble’, with previous academic literature generally using two definitions. The popular 
usage of the term, per Kindleberger (2000, p.16), is an ‘upward price movement over an 
 5 
 
extended range that then implodes’, or what Bordo and Jeanne (2002) have described as an 
‘asset price reversal’. By using this first definition it is relatively easy to detect and label a 
bubble ex-post, simply by an observation of nominal prices. As will be demonstrated below, 
the Railway Mania can be classed as a bubble using this criteria, as there was a considerable 
stock price reversal during this period. 
However, the economic definition of a bubble is a deviation from fundamental value (Flood 
and Hodrick, 1990, p.88). Using this second definition makes it much more difficult to 
definitively detect a bubble, as the concept of fundamental value is theoretical and not 
necessarily observed directly. Consequently, any apparent bubble component may be 
attributed to a mis-specification of the correct fundamental value by the researcher.  
One approach to determining whether a certain period can be classified as an economic 
bubble has been to consider whether the expectations of growth or uncertainty implied by 
asset prices were unrealistic (see Pástor and Veronesi, 2006, and Voth, 2003). Various 
econometric tests have also been proposed for the detection of bubbles, including variance 
bound tests (Shiller, 1981), the comparison of the ‘actual’ relationship and a theoretical 
‘constructed’ relationship between prices and dividends (West, 1987), co-integration tests 
which determine the orders of integration of prices and dividends (Diba and Grossman, 1988) 
and the relationship between the dividend yield and the level of dividends (Froot and 
Obstfeld, 1991).  
Neither the implied expectations approach, nor time series analysis, focus on whether 
investors made rational decisions, given the cross-section of assets available for investment at 
a particular time. If investors were rational they should have ensured that at any time each 
asset reflected only the sum of discounted expected cash flows, with each asset priced 
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consistently after controlling for factors such as dividends, growth and risk. By extension, 
assets in one industry should have been priced consistently with other industries, after 
accounting for such factors.  
In the context of the Railway Mania, this would mean that if investors were rational and a 
bubble did not exist, the railways should have been priced consistently with the non-railways. 
Consistency of pricing would suggest that railway stock prices were determined by the same 
fundamental factors as non-railway stock prices, whilst inconsistency could suggest an 
irrational preference for the railways. This paper goes on to test the consistency of pricing 
during the Railway Mania by analysing whether railway stock prices were significantly 
different from other industries, after controlling for dividends, growth and risk. 
2 Background to Railway Mania 
The first modern passenger railway was the Liverpool and Manchester, which was promoted 
in 1824, authorised by Parliament in 1826, and opened in 1830. Over the subsequent decade 
about another sixty railways were constructed, with most of the lines projected during a 
minor promotion boom in 1836 and 1837. However, further promotion was subdued until the 
early 1840s. A period known as the Railway Mania then ensued, with share prices rising 
substantially from 1843 to 1845, and then falling steadily until 1850.  
The initial phase of the Mania was associated with strong economic growth, and a low rate of 
interest, with 3 per cent Consols, government debt perpetuities, reaching par for the first time 
for over a century (Economist, April 13, 1844, p.674). A widespread reduction in fares, 
combined with the strong economic conditions, produced a rapid increase in passenger 
numbers and revenues for the railways. Between 1843 and 1846, first class traffic on the ten 
largest railways increased by 33 per cent, whilst second class and third class traffic increased 
by 68 per cent and 187 per cent respectively. This resulted in an overall increase in passenger 
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receipts of 41 per cent, whilst receipts from goods traffic also increased, by 42 per cent 
(Parliamentary Papers, 1847). These increases in traffic and receipts were achieved with a 
relatively small increase of 25 per cent in the mileage open of the largest lines. 
As the period progressed the promotion of new railway companies increased, reaching 
unprecedented levels in the autumn of 1845, just as railway share prices peaked. Some 
estimates suggested that over one thousand new railways were promoted at this time (The 
Times, November 17, 1845, p.4), although only a small number of these were ever 
constructed. These promotions exposed existing railways to the threat of competition, and 
encouraged amalgamations, often resulting in established lines purchasing newer lines which 
tended to earn lower returns on capital.  
The downturn in asset prices, beginning in the autumn of 1845, also coincided with the 
discovery of a potato blight, and defective harvest, which led to an economic downturn and 
the Irish Famine. A financial crisis then followed in 1847, which involved distress amongst 
many banks and merchants, and led to a further reduction in economic growth (Evans, 1849). 
A feature of the downturn was the revelation of fraud amongst several large railways, but 
most of the allegations centred around companies controlled by just one chairman, George 
Hudson. Even amongst Hudson’s companies, the mis-statements appear to have begun after 
the Mania had ended (Railway Times, 1849, pp. 441, 690, 1086). Receipts from traffic 
continued to grow during the latter half of the decade, but the mileage open on the railway 
network had expanded considerably, and the resulting increase in operating expenses and 
issue of equity reduced the returns available to investors. 
Commentary throughout the period suggested that dividends were regarded as an important 
consideration in the valuation of railway stocks. For example, the Economist (November 8, 
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1845, p.1109) noted that ‘with regard to the finished and dividend paying lines, they are of 
course calculated so as to yield a given rate of interest which must always have some 
reference to the rate which other securities yield, and so far the price of shares should 
fluctuate with other securities.’ Similarly, an investment pamphlet entitled the Short and Sure 
Guide to Railway Speculation advised that ‘as regards the purchase of shares in the 
established lines we have simply to compare the market price of the share with the dividend 
which it pays’ (Anon., 1845, pp.5-6). It went on to note that ‘taking the value of money at 
four per cent, the shares in a railway which pays six per cent per annum are worth £150 each; 
or in one which pays ten per cent they are worth £250 each. If bought below these prices, the 
purchaser is receiving, pro tanto, a better rate than four per cent, and he will accept this better 
rate, in proportion to any doubt he may have with respect to the dividend being maintained.’  
3 Data 
To improve our understanding of the Railway Mania, a unique and comprehensive dataset 
has been constructed, by inputting the original share price tables published in a weekly 
newspaper, the Railway Times, between 1843 and 1850. As this paper focuses entirely on 
those companies which were capable of paying dividends throughout this period, only the 
railways in operation at the beginning of the Mania, and the firms which resulted from 
mergers involving these lines, are included. The share price dataset was supplemented with 
data on dividends, collected from the Course of the Exchange, an official stockbroker list for 
the London stock market. 
There were 64 railways listed in the Railway Times in the first week of 1843. However, the 
Course of the Exchange contained dividend data on only 41 of these railways. Due to a high 
number of mergers and acquisitions, the number of railway companies fell throughout the 
sample. If an established railway, in existence at the start of 1843, participated in a merger 
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then the new company was also treated as an established railway and it was assumed that 
investors in the original company went on to receive the dividend of the merged firm. By the 
end of 1850 there were 27 established railways listed in the Railway Times, and dividend data 
was available from the Course of the Exchange for 24 of these railways.  
Data on the twenty largest non-railway companies by market capitalisation was also obtained 
from the Course of the Exchange. These twenty companies represented 45.2 per cent of total 
non-railway market capitalization at the beginning of 1843, suggesting that they give a good 
representation of the overall market.  There are six banks, five insurance companies, three 
canals, three docks, two gas, light, and coke companies, and one waterworks company 
included. Bank of England stock and East India stock have been excluded from the non-
railway sample as they were issued by companies with a strong relationship to the 
government.  
The number of shares in issue (N), the share price (P) and the par value (Z) of each of the 
securities was recorded for each of the 417 weeks in the sample period. The par value of a 
share was the total amount of equity which shareholders had paid to the company for that 
security. The share price/par ratio (P/Z) has been calculated for each security for each week, 
and is used to standardise prices in a manner which is similar to the market to book ratio. 
During this period dividends (D) were also generally expressed in terms of par value, with the 
dividend/par ratio (D/Z) providing an estimate of the shareholders’ return on their equity 
investment. Dividend growth has been calculated as the change in the dividend/par ratio, 
∆(D/Z) between different periods. To enable the analysis of dividend changes beyond the 
main sample period the dividend rates of companies until 1855 were included in the dataset. 
The dividend yield (D/P) has also been calculated for each security, for each week of the 
sample, by computing the dividend/price ratio.  
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Fama and French (1992) suggest that risk dimensions can be proxied by size and book-to-
market variables. A proxy for the book-to-market variable (P/Z) will be used as the 
dependent variable in the following analysis, so it cannot also be included as an explanatory 
variable. However, size can be controlled for, and an estimate of the beta can also be made. 
The size (S) of the company has been measured as the market capitalisation of the firm, 
calculated as the number of shares in issue multiplied by the price of each share. The beta (B) 
of each firm has been estimated for each company for each year, by regressing the weekly 
returns of each asset minus the risk free rate, against the weekly returns of the market 
portfolio minus the risk free rate. The market portfolio has been approximated by the non-
railways’ market index, consistent with the approach of Pástor and Veronesi (2009) when 
calculating the beta of the early US railroads. The risk-free rate has been approximated by the 
yield on 3 per cent Consols. A railway dummy variable (R) has also been created, which 
equals one when the company was a railway, and zero otherwise. 
Only those companies which had been traded, and had an observable share price, could be 
included in the analysis, which reduced the sample size mainly in the early months of 1843. 
For calculations involving the price/par ratio three outliers with extremely high dividend/par 
ratios, defined as being above 15 percent, were excluded as small changes in their price gives 
the appearance of shifts in the estimated coefficients, which is misleading with regards the 
rest of the sample. However, robustness tests described at the end of the paper illustrate that 
the key results remain the same when these outliers are included. For the calculations 
explaining variations in the dividend yield, these three companies have been included, as they 
did not have extreme dividend yields, but observations where a company had a zero dividend 
yield are excluded, as such observations do not reveal any information about pricing.  
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The average number of companies analysed each week in the regressions involving the share 
price/par ratio was 40.2, which over the 417 weeks of the sample results in 16,770 
observations. For those regressions involving the dividend yield, there were an average of 
39.6 companies included per week, which involved a total of 16,501 observations over the 
sample. When periods of future dividend growth are included, these figures are reduced 
slightly due to data availability.  
4 Movement of Stock Prices and Dividends 
Weekly market indices for the established railway companies and the non-railway companies, 
for which share price and dividend data are available, have been constructed and are plotted 
in Figure 1. In each case the market return has been calculated on a weekly basis by 
weighting the capital gains of each company by its market capitalisation at the end of the 
preceding week. 
<<INSERT FIGURE 1>> 
The index representing the established railways rose from a base of 1,000 in January 1843 to 
a peak of 1,718 on August 8, 1845, but the non-railways index had risen to just 1,152 by this 
time. The established railway index then fell substantially, declining by 18.5 per cent by the 
end of November 1845, whilst the non-railways fell by 5.9 per cent during the same period. 
The established railway index then stabilised throughout 1846, before beginning a steady 
decline from January 1847 onwards, with the sample ending in 1850 with the established 
railway index at 727, and the non-railway index at 1042.  
Whilst the prices of railway shares changed dramatically, railway dividends also rose and fell 
substantially. As can be seen from Figure 2, the dividends, as a percentage of par value, paid 
by established railways at the beginning of 1843 averaged 4.3 per cent. They then increased 
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steadily, reaching a peak of 7.2 per cent in July 1847, before falling to just 2.9 per cent by the 
end of 1850. Higher dividends were evident in almost every one of the major railways during 
the boom, and dividend declines were almost universal during the downturn. The dividends 
paid by the non-railways were much less volatile, beginning 1843 at an average of 6.4 per 
cent, and reaching 6.6 per cent by 1844, but they then fell slightly, ending 1850 at 6.1 per 
cent. It is interesting to note that the peak in railway share prices occurred almost two years 
before the peak in railway dividends, perhaps suggesting that investors were including 
estimates of future dividend changes into prices before the rates had actually changed. 
<<INSERT FIGURE 2>> 
The dividend/price ratios of the railway and non-railway industries are plotted in Figure 3. 
The railway industry dividend yield has been calculated as the total dividends paid by all the 
established railways as a fraction of the total market capitalisation of those railways, with the 
non-railways calculated in a similar manner. At the beginning of 1843 the dividend yields of 
the railway and non-railway industries were close, being 4.6 per cent and 4.8 per cent 
respectively. Although railway prices and dividends both rose and then fell during the sample 
period, prices seem to have moved in advance of dividends, resulting in a changing dividend 
yield. The railway industry dividend yield initially fell, reaching a minimum of 3.3 per cent in 
February 1844, but then rose substantially, reaching a peak of 7.3 per cent in October 1848.  
During the same period, the non-railway industry dividend yield remained between 4.2 and 
5.2 per cent. 
<<INSERT FIGURE 3>> 
Total return indices have also been constructed, which combine both capital gains and 
dividends, and are shown in Figure 4. The established railways total return index reaches a 
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peak of 1,897 in August 1845, and ends the sample at a level of 1,056, implying that even 
after dividends have been included the total return to investors in established railways was 
close to zero between 1843 and 1850. In contrast, the non-railways finish the sample period 
at 1,513, which was the peak for the sample period. 
<<INSERT FIGURE 4>> 
Descriptive statistics for each of the key variables included in the subsequent regression 
analysis have been reported in Table 1, by industry and by year. For the railways both the 
mean share price/par ratio and dividend/par ratio initially rise and then decline, whilst the 
non-railways show less movement over time. The non-railways consistently have both a 
higher price/par and dividend/par ratio throughout the period, but much of this is due to three 
non-railway outliers with very high ratios, which have been excluded from the price/par 
regressions. When these are removed the average price/par ratio of the non-railways falls 
from about 2.0 to 1.3, whilst the average dividend/par ratio falls from about 10.0 to 5.8 per 
cent for the whole period. 
<<INSERT TABLE 1>> 
The mean dividend yield of the railways also shows more change over time than that of the 
non-railways, with the railways initially having a relatively lower yield, before a dramatic 
rise gave them a relatively higher yield in 1847 and 1848. As a zero dividend yield does not 
reveal anything about prices, those companies with a zero yield are excluded from the 
dividend yield regressions. When these companies are removed the average yield for the 
whole period for the railways rises from 3.9 to 4.7 per cent, whilst the non-railways remain at 
4.9 per cent. 
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The average beta of the railways rose and fell, but remained below one throughout the period, 
reflecting the weakness of the relationship between the movement in railway shares and the 
non-railways. Due to the possibility of errors-in-variables in the beta estimate, the subsequent 
regression analysis has been repeated without the inclusion of the beta variable and the key 
results remain the same, as discussed at the end of the paper. 
The size variable reveals that the average market capitalisation of the railways was similar to 
that of the non-railways at the start of the period. However, the market capitalisation of the 
railways increased at a much faster rate during the early years of the boom, reflecting both 
higher prices and more shares being issued. This resulted in the railways being larger than the 
non-railways for most of the period.  
5 Panel Cointegration 
One approach to analysing the relationship between stock prices and dividends is to consider 
whether these variables cointegrate. Table 2 reports results of a panel cointegration analysis 
for railway assets during the sample period. To be included in the analysis each variable, for 
each company, must be integrated of order 1, and the value of the variable must have changed 
at least once during the sample period. Fisher-type ADF panel unit root tests, which can be 
conducted on unbalanced panels (Maddala and Wu, 1999), are reported for each variable and 
illustrate that the variables are I(1). 
<<INSERT TABLE 2>> 
Seven panel cointegration tests are reported, based on Pedroni (1999, 2004), each of which 
tests the null hypothesis of no cointegration. The first four tests, referred to as within-
dimension panel statistics, have an alternative hypothesis H1: ãi=ã<1 for all i, presuming a 
common value for ã, the autoregressive coefficient. The first test is a nonparametric variance 
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ratio statistic, the second and third are nonparametric statistics similar to the Phillips and 
Perron rho statistic and t-statistic respectively, whilst the fourth is similar to the Dickey-
Fuller t-statistic. The latter three tests, referred to as between-dimension group statistics, have 
an alternative hypothesis H1:ãi=ãi<1 for all i, which does not presume a common value for ã, 
the autoregressive coefficient. These tests are analogous to the Phillips and Perron rho 
statistic and t-statistics, and the Dickey-Fuller t-statistic respectively.  
When only the price/par and dividend/par variables are analysed, just one of the seven test 
statistics rejects the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 10 per cent level, as shown in 
Table 2. However, this lack of cointegration does not necessarily imply that investors were 
acting irrationally. If expectations move in advance of dividends then the relationship 
between prices and current dividends may not be stable. To account for the difference in 
timing, the analysis has been repeated with a variable for the future growth in dividends, 
calculated for each company as the change in the dividend/par ratio over the next two years. 
A time span of two years has been chosen as the peak in share prices occurred approximately 
two years before the peak in dividends. When the dividend growth variable is included in the 
cointegrating relationship, six of the seven test statistics rejects the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration at the 10 per cent level, as shown in Table 2. These results suggest that there 
may have been a relationship between prices, dividends and growth during the sample period, 
a finding which may challenge the popular characterisation of this period as a Mania. 
6 Cross-Sectional Analysis with Current Dividends 
Although the results discussed in the previous section suggest that there may be evidence of 
cointegration, a panel analysis may be regarded as insufficient for two reasons. Firstly, the 
power of the tests may be affected by the relatively short time span which is considered. 
Shiller and Perron (1985) have argued that it is the length of the period, rather than the 
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frequency of the data, that matters for the power of tests involving time series. Additional 
analysis considering the cross-section of assets at particular times may provide further 
evidence of the relationship between prices and dividends. 
Secondly, a panel analysis considers all entities and time periods together. Analysing each 
week individually can provide more detailed insights into how investors priced the cross-
section of assets which were available at any given time. Examining the cross-section of 
assets at particular times can reveal whether railways were priced consistently with non-
railways given their respective dividends, growth and risk at those times. The focus is on 
whether investors acted rationally given the cross-section of assets which were available to 
them for investment. Repeating this cross-sectional analysis across time periods can give an 
indication of how the pricing of the railways relative to the non-railways changed over time. 
This is particularly important for a sample which includes periods that may be loosely 
referred to as pre-Mania, Mania, and post-Mania. 
The rest of this paper examines the pricing of assets during the Railway Mania using a cross-
sectional methodology, with two functional forms being considered to ensure robustness. The 
first approach, shown in Equation 1, relates each asset’s share price (P) with its dividend (D), 
both standardised by the par value (Z). Two risk factors are controlled for, namely the firm’s 
beta (B), and size (S). A dummy for the railway industry (R) is included to determine whether 
the railways were priced differently from the non-railways. 
For week = t 
𝑃𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑍𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1
𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑍𝑖,𝑡
+𝛽2𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝜀 
(1) 
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The second approach, shown in Equation 2, expresses the share price and dividend as a 
dividend yield (D/P), and also controls for beta (B) and size (S). A dummy for the railway 
industry (R) is again included. 
For week = t 
𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑃𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝜀 
(2) 
A cross-sectional regression is estimated for each week. As each week’s regression is 
independent of every other week, there are no multiple observations of any company in any 
regression. Table 3 reports the coefficients and standard errors for selected weeks, with one 
regression for the start of the period, the last week of each year and for the peak in prices on 
August 8, 1845. This analysis was repeated for each of the 417 weeks of the sample period, 
with the last column reporting the number of weeks during which each variable was 
significant.  
<< INSERT TABLE 3 >> 
It can be seen from Panel A of Table 3, that the coefficient of the dividend variable was 
significantly greater than zero on 399 out of the 417 weeks in the sample. Panel A of Figure 5 
illustrates this finding, and charts the relationship between the standardised dividend and 
share price for each week, with a 95 per cent confidence interval constructed from each 
week’s robust standard errors.   
<< INSERT FIGURE 5 >> 
Panel A of Table 3 suggests that using Equation 1, the railway dummy was significant on 192 
weeks during the sample. This represents 31 weeks when the railway dummy was 
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significantly greater than zero, implying that the railways may have had a significantly higher 
price, and 161 weeks when the railway dummy was significantly less than zero, implying a 
relatively lower price, given their current dividends and risk factors. Panel A of Figure 6 
shows that the coefficient of the railway dummy rose throughout the first few years of the 
sample, and was significantly positive for periods between 1844 and 1846, before falling and 
becoming significantly negative for a sustained period between 1847 and 1850.  
 << INSERT FIGURE 6 >> 
Panel B of Table 3 reveals that when dividend yields are analysed using Equation 2, the 
railway dummy was significant on 148 weeks. This consists of 110 weeks when the railway 
dummy was significantly less than zero, which in this specification implies a relatively higher 
price, and 38 weeks when the railway dummy was significantly greater than zero, implying a 
relatively lower price. Panel A of Figure 7 shows that the railway dummy was significantly 
negative throughout most of 1844 and 1845, before rising during the latter half of the decade. 
<< INSERT FIGURE 7 >> 
The above results suggest that the current dividend rate was a highly significant factor in 
determining the prices of assets during the Railway Mania. Nevertheless, although changes in 
the current dividend rate may explain part of the increase in the nominal prices of railway 
shares, it cannot fully explain all of the changes. Railways appear to have had a significantly 
higher share price for a period during the boom, and a significantly lower share price for a 
period during the downturn, after accounting for current dividend rates. However, rather than 
reflecting mispricing, these differences may reflect expectations of dividend growth, which 
investors may also have considered in their valuations. 
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7 Cross-Sectional Analysis with Dividend Growth 
One approach to considering the relationship between prices and future dividends has been to 
illustrate the association between the dividend yield and future dividend growth as per 
Campbell and Shiller (1998). Figure 8 plots the relationship between the dividend yield and 
the next period’s dividend growth for each company in the sample, with one observation per 
company at the end of each of the sixteen half-years in the sample. The results suggest that 
there was a negative correlation which would imply that companies with a low dividend 
yield, meaning a relatively high price, went on to experience relatively higher growth. 
<< INSERT FIGURE 8 >> 
To estimate the extent of mispricing whenever future dividend growth has been accounted 
for, the cross-sectional regressions discussed in the previous section have been extended. By 
considering the possibility that investors’ expectations of the next n half-years of dividend 
changes were accurate, it is possible to estimate whether railway shares were mispriced, 
given expectations of dividend growth. 
The first approach, explaining the share price/par ratio per Equation 1, was extended to 
consider the impact of including the next n half-years of dividend changes. A railway dummy 
(R) was again included to estimate the proportion of the share price/par ratio (P/Z) of railway 
companies which could not be explained by the current dividend/par ratio (D/Z), future 
changes in dividends, ∆(D/Z), beta (B) and size (S), as shown in Equation 3. This approach 
was repeated with the inclusion of varying numbers of future changes in dividends. 
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For week = t 
𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑍𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1
𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑍𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽2𝐸𝑡  ∆
𝐷𝑖 ,𝑡+𝑛
𝑍𝑖,𝑡+𝑛
 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝜀 
(3) 
The second approach, explaining the dividend yield per Equation 2, was also extended to 
consider the impact of the next n half-years of dividend changes. A railway dummy (R) was 
again included to estimate the proportion of the dividend yield (D/P) of railway companies 
which could not be explained by future changes in dividends, ∆(D/Z), beta (B) and size (S), as 
shown in Equation 4. This approach was repeated with the inclusion of varying numbers of 
future changes in dividends. 
For week = t 
𝐷𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑃𝑖 ,𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑡  ∆
𝐷𝑖,𝑡+𝑛
𝑍𝑖,𝑡+𝑛
 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝜀 
(4) 
The number of weeks that each variable was significant in each specification is reported in 
Table 4. Panel A reports regressions explaining the share price/par ratio (P/Z), and reveals 
that when future dividend changes are controlled for, the current dividend/par ratio was 
significant in all 417 weeks of the sample, regardless of the number of future dividend 
changes included. This can be seen from the graphical analysis in Panel B of Figure 5 which 
also suggests that the size of the dividend coefficient remained relatively steady once future 
growth is accounted for. The next half-year of dividend growth was significant for between 
250 and 312 weeks, with the second half-year of dividend growth significant for between 136 
and 210 weeks, depending on the number of other changes included. Dividend changes 
beyond this were significant in between 81 and 153 weeks. The number of weeks that the 
railway dummy was significant declines from 192 weeks to just 18 weeks as additional 
dividend growth is included. 
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<< INSERT TABLE 4 >> 
In Panel B of Table 4 the number of weeks that each variable was significant when 
explaining the dividend yield is reported. The next half-year of dividend growth was 
significant for between 283 and 349 weeks, depending on the number of future changes 
included, with the second half-year of dividend growth significant for between 173 and 233 
weeks. Further dividend changes were significant for between 144 and 193 weeks. The 
number of weeks that the railway dummy was significant declines from 148 weeks to 
between 11 and 12 weeks, when three or four future dividend changes were included. 
Tables 5 and 6 analyse the number of weeks that the railway dummy was significant, by year, 
and considers whether the dummy implied that railways were overpriced or underpriced, 
given that the other variables had been controlled for. In Table 5, analysing the share 
price/par ratio regressions, the railways were defined as overpriced in a particular week if the 
railway dummy was significantly greater than zero during that particular week, and 
underpriced if the railway dummy was significantly less than zero during that week. The total 
weeks of overpricing and underpricing for each year were then calculated.  
<< INSERT TABLES 5 AND 6 >> 
When zero years of dividend growth are included, the railways appear to have been 
overpriced on 31 weeks of the sample, but when between three and six half-years of dividend 
growth are included this apparent overpricing is entirely eliminated. A period of underpricing 
remains, but this is relatively small in size and an unreported analysis suggests it would be 
completely eliminated if the extent of dividend declines after 1847 had been just one 
percentage point more than actually occurred. The graphical analysis in Panel B of Figure 6 
shows that when four half-years of dividend growth are accounted for, the coefficient of the 
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railway dummy remains close to zero throughout the period, and is never significantly greater 
than zero. 
Using the second approach, of analysing differences in dividend yields, the railways were 
estimated to be overpriced during a particular week when the railway dummy was 
significantly less than zero, and underpriced when the dividend yield of the railways was 
significantly higher than the non-railways. Results are shown in Table 6 for the number of 
weeks of overpricing and underpricing when varying numbers of half-years of dividend 
growth was accounted for. 
When no future dividend growth was accounted for, the railways appear to have been 
significantly overpriced for 110 weeks, but this is reduced to zero weeks when four half-years 
of dividend growth are accounted for. There is a small amount of underpricing remaining 
near the end of the sample, but this would also have been entirely eliminated if dividends had 
fallen by an additional one percentage point after 1847. Panel B of Figure 7 shows that when 
the next four half-years of dividend growth are considered, the coefficient of the railway 
dummy remains very close to zero throughout the boom in prices, and is only significantly 
different from zero for a brief period during the downturn. 
8 Robustness 
To ensure robustness, additional variations of the analysis have also been considered, 
although not tabulated separately. The share price/par regressions have been repeated with 
the inclusion of the three non-railway outliers which had extremely high dividend/par ratios. 
The key results remain the same, with the dividend variable significant during every week, 
and the railway dummy suggesting that the railways were not significantly overpriced in any 
week during the sample. The main difference is that the coefficients and standard errors are 
slightly more volatile over time, reflecting the impact that small changes in these outliers had. 
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Due to the possibility of errors-in-variables in the estimation of beta, the analysis has been 
repeated without this variable. In both the share price/par and the dividend yield regressions 
the key finding of zero weeks of overpricing remains when four periods of dividend growth 
are controlled for. An analysis was also carried out excluding four railways where allegations 
of fraud were made in the aftermath of the Mania. The results continue to suggest no 
overpricing for the share price/par regressions throughout the period. The dividend yield 
regressions continue to suggest no overpricing during the boom, but there may have been five 
weeks of overpricing during 1849, when the allegations of fraud were revealed. 
When the dividend growth variables are expressed in terms of annual growth, rather than the 
semi-annual growth discussed above, the results when two years of growth are included 
suggest between 0 and 2 weeks of overpricing depending on the functional form. When the 
dividend growth during the next two years is expressed as a single variable the results suggest 
between 0 and 3 weeks of overpricing depending on the functional form. 
When a large number of dividend growth variables are included there is a suggestion that the 
apparent overpricing of the railways begins to re-appear. For example, with five years of 
dividend growth expressed in semi-annual variables, there appears to between 9 and 17 
weeks of overpricing depending on the functional form used. This may indicate that investors 
were able to successfully forecast short-term dividend changes, but did not expect the longer-
term changes which occurred. This is consistent with the finding that the peak in prices 
occurred about two years before the peak in dividends. 
9 Conclusion 
This paper, which has examined the sustained rise and fall in stock prices during the British 
Railway Mania, has an important implication for the current debate on ‘bubbles’. It suggests 
that even on occasions where there is a sustained increase in asset prices it may be that 
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investors are acting rationally, as these high prices may reflect growth in fundamentals. A 
subsequent fall in asset prices may be caused by a previously unexpected decline in 
fundamentals.  
Using a comprehensive dataset of share prices and dividends for established railways and 
non-railways, this paper has found that dividends remained extremely important to the 
valuation of shares throughout the period 1843 to 1850, which included the Railway Mania 
and the subsequent downturn. The cross-sectional variation in dividends had a positive and 
significant relationship with the cross-sectional variation in share prices in every week during 
this period. There was also a highly significant relationship between current prices and future 
dividend growth, suggesting that investors incorporated short-term future changes in 
dividends into their valuations. 
When only the current dividend rate and risk factors were controlled for, the railways appear 
to have been overpriced for a considerable period during the boom, with estimates ranging 
from between 31 to 110 weeks depending on the functional form used in the estimation. 
However, when short-term future changes in dividends are included the apparent overpricing 
is entirely eliminated. This suggests that, given their fundamentals, railways were priced 
consistently with non-railways during this period, which could be interpreted to mean that the 
Railway Mania was not a bubble in the economic sense. 
The importance of fundamentals during this episode illustrates that it may be inappropriate to 
suggest that asset price reversals can be attributed to irrationality, and highlights the 
difficulties of dealing with such periods in a modern context. Bernanke (2002) has argued, 
that ‘to declare that a bubble exists, the Fed must not only be able to accurately estimate the 
unobservable fundamentals underlying equity valuations, it must have confidence that it can 
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do so better than the financial professionals whose collective information is reflected in asset-
market prices.’ If investors continue to act rationally during an asset price boom, as they 
seemed to have continued to do during the British Railway Mania, then it may be unrealistic 
to expect regulators to be able to forecast and prevent financial instability ex-ante, when 
investors cannot. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Companies by Industry on Selected Dates 
             
  
 Jan 6, 1843 Dec 29, 1843 Dec 27, 1844 Aug 8, 1845 Dec 26, 1845 Dec 25, 1846 Dec 31, 1847 Dec 29, 1848 Dec 28, 1849 Dec 27, 1850 
             
Number of Companies Established Railways N 22 26 24 25 24 22 19 23 22 23 
 Non-Railways N 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
             
Price/Par ratio (P/Z) Established Railways Mean 0.90 1.15 1.40 1.70 1.56 1.30 0.95 0.77 0.57 0.68 
  St. Dev. 0.57 0.63 0.59 0.56 0.47 0.34 0.30 0.30 0.33 0.40 
  Max 2.10 2.40 2.58 2.80 2.40 1.94 1.48 1.49 1.40 1.67 
  Min 0.26 0.40 0.46 0.68 0.56 0.50 0.29 0.16 0.04 0.12 
             
 Non-Railways Mean 2.05 2.24 2.32 2.28 2.02 1.93 1.79 1.64 1.96 2.03 
  St. Dev. 1.97 2.36 2.26 2.20 1.74 1.72 1.73 1.60 2.43 2.46 
  Max 8.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 12.00 12.00 
  Min 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.88 0.68 0.53 0.40 0.43 0.63 0.66 
             
Dividend/Par ratio (D/Z) Established Railways Mean 4.11% 3.81% 4.66% 5.23% 5.35% 5.57% 5.58% 5.33% 2.95% 2.27% 
  St. Dev. 3.16% 3.27% 3.19% 3.35% 3.42% 3.38% 2.77% 2.30% 2.94% 1.91% 
  Max 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 12.10% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 7.00% 
  Min 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
             
 Non-Railways Mean 10.16% 10.33% 10.35% 10.15% 10.20% 9.75% 9.40% 9.35% 9.94% 9.64% 
  St. Dev. 10.76% 10.67% 10.66% 10.74% 10.71% 9.92% 10.14% 10.17% 11.30% 10.80% 
  Max 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 50.00% 50.00% 
  Min 3.00% 4.00% 4.50% 4.00% 4.50% 5.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3.00% 4.00% 
             
Dividend Yield (D/P) Established Railways Mean 4.74% 3.02% 3.17% 2.78% 3.14% 4.02% 5.57% 6.89% 4.28% 2.85% 
  St. Dev. 3.14% 1.80% 1.53% 1.57% 1.76% 2.03% 1.99% 3.06% 3.89% 1.74% 
  Max 11.92% 7.00% 4.83% 4.88% 5.26% 7.96% 8.86% 16.84% 14.04% 5.19% 
  Min 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
             
 Non-Railways Mean 4.81% 4.69% 4.43% 4.30% 4.84% 5.17% 4.94% 5.36% 5.17% 4.95% 
  St. Dev. 1.02% 1.03% 1.18% 1.08% 1.66% 2.27% 1.87% 2.34% 1.88% 1.65% 
  Max 7.11% 7.14% 7.27% 6.86% 8.89% 11.43% 10.00% 10.97% 10.81% 10.81% 
  Min 2.08% 2.98% 2.70% 2.66% 2.78% 2.53% 0.00% 0.00% 2.96% 2.84% 
             
Beta (B) Established Railways Mean 0.27 0.37 0.62 0.68 0.60 0.75 0.12 -0.15 0.00 -0.14 
  St. Dev. 0.83 0.73 2.19 2.53 2.55 1.16 0.47 2.22 1.08 1.17 
  Max 2.17 2.17 5.75 5.46 5.46 3.62 1.19 7.07 1.39 0.96 
  Min -1.27 -0.88 -3.87 -9.34 -9.34 -0.83 -0.99 -7.03 -3.77 -4.11 
             
 Non-Railways Mean 1.22 1.22 1.06 1.01 1.01 1.28 1.24 1.06 1.10 1.11 
  St. Dev. 2.92 2.92 1.23 1.22 1.22 2.86 2.60 2.25 2.13 4.11 
  Max 12.77 12.77 4.73 4.03 4.03 12.57 8.25 10.17 9.59 18.32 
  Min -0.14 -0.14 -0.32 -0.65 -0.65 -0.35 -0.89 -0.50 -0.02 -0.90 
             
Size in £000s  (S) Established Railways Mean 1,488.9 1,790.5 2,380.5 3,502.7 3,339.1 3,460.3 4,304.8 3,887.2 3,234.0 3,899.5 
  St. Dev. 2,117.1 2,585.8 2,778.2 3,673.1 3,085.8 3,919.4 5,328.4 4,629.7 4,252.9 5,264.7 
  Max 9,527.3 13,065.4 12,524.5 14,922.1 12,379.1 17,268.2 22,602.4 17,577.1 15,580.6 22,942.2 
  Min 64.0 88.0 73.0 94.9 290.9 162.9 426.0 203.0 84.0 112.1 
             
 Non-Railways Mean 1,123.5 1,228.8 1,351.2 1,324.7 1,231.2 1,205.9 1,075.4 1,015.1 1,182.0 1,227.5 
  St. Dev. 595.5 682.8 791.0 757.3 738.0 782.0 663.1 698.1 894.0 911.5 
  Max 2,849.7 3,238.3 3,886.0 3,853.6 3,626.9 3,659.3 3,173.5 3,367.8 4,329.6 4,366.0 
  Min 600.0 600.0 720.0 787.5 607.5 357.2 357.2 339.3 330.4 330.4 
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Table 2: Panel Cointegration Tests for Railways 
 
 
All tests 𝐻0: 𝑎 𝑖 = 1 (implies no cointegration) 
Within-dimension panel tests  𝐻1: 𝑎 𝑖 = 𝑎 < 1 for all i 
Between-dimension group tests  𝐻1: 𝑎 𝑖 = 𝑎 𝑖 < 1 for all i 
Where 𝑎  is the autorgressive coefficient. 
 
 
Statistic P-value 
 
 Unit Root Tests (Fisher Chi-Square ADF Tests)  
 Levels  
  P/Z 35.912 0.956 
 D/Z 37.207 0.939 
 Δ(D/Z)2Year 45.169 0.738 
First Difference  
  P/Z 2630.070 0.000 
 D/Z 2905.580 0.000 
 Δ(D/Z)2Year 2891.260 0.000 
   
 Cointegration: P/Z, D/Z  
 Within-dimension Panel tests 
  V 0.157 0.438 
 Rho -0.426 0.335 
 PP 0.151 0.560 
 ADF 0.569 0.715 
Between-dimension Group tests 
  Rho -1.345 0.089 
 PP -0.501 0.308 
 ADF 0.228 0.590 
 
   Cointegration: P/Z, D/Z, Δ(D/Z)2Year 
 Within-dimension Panel tests 
  V 1.134 0.129 
 Rho -3.869 0.000 
 PP -2.096 0.018 
 ADF -1.286 0.099 
Between-dimension Group tests 
  Rho -3.365 0.000 
 PP -2.436 0.007 
 ADF -1.598 0.055 
 
 
   Number of Cross-Sections 26 
  Number of Observations 6,648 
  
   Notes: Unit root tests based on Fisher type ADF statistics (Maddala and Wu, 1999). Each unit root test 
has null hypothesis of a unit root. Cointegration tests based on Pedroni (1999, 2004). Each cointegration 
test has the null hypothesis of no cointegration H0: ãi=1. Within-dimension panel tests have an alternative 
hypothesis H1: ãi=ã<1 for all i, presuming a common value for ã, the autoregressive coefficient. 
Between-dimension group tests have an alternative hypothesis H1: ãi=ãi<1 for all i, which does not 
presume a common value for ã, the autoregressive coefficient. v-statistic is a nonparametric variance 
ratio statistic, rho-statistic is analogous to the Phillips and Perron rho statistic, PP statistic is analogous to 
the Phillips and Perron t statistic, ADF statistic is analogous to the Dickey-Fuller t-statistic. Individual 
intercept included in estimation. Automatic lag selection based on Schwarz Information Criterion. 
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Table 3: Cross-sectional Regressions on Selected Weeks 
Panel A: Price/Paid 
             
 
Jan 6, 
1843 
Dec 29, 
1843 
Dec 27, 
1844 
Aug 8, 
1845 
Dec 26, 
1845 
Dec 25, 
1846 
Dec 31, 
1847 
Dec 29, 
1848 
Dec 28, 
1849 
Dec 27, 
1850 
 Total 
No. of 
Weeks 
Sig. 
             
D/Z 0.113*** 0.153*** 0.106*** 0.120*** 0.125*** 0.056* 0.113*** 0.116*** 0.102*** 0.208***  399 
 (0.030) (0.020) (0.032) (0.021) (0.018) (0.032) (0.015) (0.016) (0.020) (0.018)   
R -0.181 0.153* 0.051 0.252** 0.211** -0.075 -0.284*** -0.387*** -0.435*** 0.156  192 
 (0.107) (0.088) (0.094) (0.101) (0.102) (0.108) (0.091) (0.090) (0.120) (0.096)   
B 0.021 0.072* 0.024 0.027 -0.053*** -0.051 -0.013 0.009 0.030 0.039***  118 
 (0.033) (0.042) (0.032) (0.027) (0.017) (0.093) (0.021) (0.015) (0.032) (0.007)   
S 0.065** 0.029* 0.043** 0.024 0.008 0.020 -0.000 0.007 0.009 -0.008  78 
 (0.025) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.015) (0.015) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006)   
Constant 0.518*** 0.331** 0.732*** 0.719*** 0.681*** 1.034*** 0.603*** 0.512*** 0.679*** 0.089  400 
 (0.176) (0.122) (0.205) (0.127) (0.117) (0.200) (0.115) (0.109) (0.137) (0.117)   
             
Obs. 39 43 41 42 41 39 36 40 39 40  16,770 
R
2
 0.643 0.683 0.446 0.617 0.594 0.329 0.659 0.663 0.739 0.871  0.598 
             
Notes: A regression estimating Equation 1 is reported for selected weeks of the sample. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance given by *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The total number of weeks that a variable is significant is shown in final column. P=Share Price, Z=Par Value, D=Dividend, R=Railway 
Dummy, B=Beta, S=Size. 
𝑃𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑍𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1
𝐷𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑍𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽2𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝜀 
(1) 
 
Panel B: Dividend Yield 
 
              
 
Jan 6, 
1843 
Dec 29, 
1843 
Dec 27, 
1844 
Aug 8, 
1845 
Dec 26, 
1845 
Dec 25, 
1846 
Dec 31, 
1847 
Dec 29, 
1848 
Dec 28, 
1849 
Dec 27, 
1850 
 Total 
No. of 
Weeks 
Sig. 
             
R 0.011* -0.012*** -0.009** -0.011*** -0.012** -0.006 0.004 0.017* 0.014 -0.014***  148 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.011) (0.005)   
B -0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.005** 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.001*  49 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)   
S -0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.000  18 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)   
Constant 0.051*** 0.047*** 0.043*** 0.041*** 0.043*** 0.050*** 0.051*** 0.057*** 0.056*** 0.050***  417 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)   
             
Obs. 38 42 41 41 40 39 37 41 35 38  16,501 
R
2
 0.116 0.214 0.139 0.219 0.324 0.040 0.089 0.106 0.111 0.227  0.057 
             
Notes: A regression estimating Equation 2 is reported for selected weeks of the sample. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance given by *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The total number of weeks that a variable is significant is shown in final column. P=Share Price, D=Dividend, R=Railway Dummy, B=Beta, 
S=Size. 
𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑃𝑖 ,𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝜀 
 
(2) 
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Table 4: Number of Weeks during which Variables are Significant 
from Cross-Sectional Regressions 
 
Panel A: Price/Paid 
        
D 399 417 417 417 417 417 417 
R 192 188 147 87 49 31 18 
B 118 103 115 147 137 116 105 
S 78 67 48 34 15 21 19 
∆(D/Z) t+1  250 312 290 283 271 296 
∆(D/Z) t+2   136 192 195 210 171 
∆(D/Z) t+3    113 117 140 153 
∆(D/Z) t+4     87 114 116 
∆(D/Z) t+5      86 127 
∆(D/Z) t+6       81 
Cons. 400 383 324 277 217 137 95 
        
Ave. Obs. 40.2 39.0 38.0 37.3 36.9 36.5 36.3 
Obs. 16,770 16,258 15,830 15,571 15,374 15,219 15,133 
Ave. Adj R
2
 0.598 0.666 0.707 0.732 0.739 0.745 0.755 
        
Notes: A regression estimating Equation 3 was calculated for each week of the sample, with varying numbers of half-years of 
dividend growth included. The total number of weeks that a variable is significant is shown for each specification.  P=Share 
Price, Z=Par Value, D=Dividend, R=Railway Dummy, B=Beta, S=Size. 
For week = t 
𝑃𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑍𝑖 ,𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1
𝐷𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑍𝑖 ,𝑡
+ 𝛽2𝐸𝑡  ∆
𝐷𝑖 ,𝑡+𝑛
𝑍𝑖,𝑡+𝑛
 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝜀 
(3) 
 
Panel B: Dividend Yield 
        
R 148 86 38 12 11 38 44 
B 49 73 59 53 53 54 46 
S 18 18 7 11 21 24 43 
∆(D/Z) t+1  283 318 335 349 341 333 
∆(D/Z) t+2   176 233 229 212 173 
∆(D/Z) t+3    150 193 167 162 
∆(D/Z) t+4     176 198 166 
∆(D/Z) t+5      204 220 
∆(D/Z) t+6       144 
Cons. 417 417 417 417 417 417 417 
        
Ave. Obs. 39.6 38.4 37.4 36.8 36.4 36.1 35.8 
Obs. 16,501 16,002 15,586 15,356 15,193 15,038 14,932 
Ave. Adj R
2
 0.057 0.229 0.334 0.400 0.448 0.500 0.530 
        
Notes: A regression estimating Equation 4 was calculated for each week of the sample, with varying numbers of half-years of 
dividend growth included. The total number of weeks that a variable is significant is shown for each specification. P=Share 
Price, Z=Par Value, D=Dividend, R=Railway Dummy, B=Beta, S=Size. 
For week = t 
𝐷𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑃𝑖 ,𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑡  ∆
𝐷𝑖 ,𝑡+𝑛
𝑍𝑖,𝑡+𝑛
 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝜀 
(4) 
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Table 5: Estimates of the Number of Weeks of Over and Under Pricing of Railway Shares between 1843 and 1850 using 
Railway Dummy from Share Price/Par vs Dividend/Par regressions 
 
                  
 
No. of 
future 
changes in 
dividends 
included 
Overpriced or 
Underpriced 
 
1843 1844 1845 1846 1847 1848 1849 1850 
 
Total  
Relative  
to n=0 
 
Total  
(% of 
sample) 
Relative  
to n=0 (% of 
sample) 
                  
 
n = 0 Overpriced 
 
0 6 20 5 0 0 0 0 
 
31 - 
 
7.4% - 
  
Underpriced 
 
0 0 0 0 22 52 52 35 
 
161 - 
 
38.6% - 
                  
 
n = 1 Overpriced 
 
0 8 12 5 0 0 0 0 
 
25 -6 
 
6.0% -1.4% 
  
Underpriced 
 
0 0 0 0 40 52 52 19 
 
163 2 
 
39.1% 0.5% 
                  
 
n = 2 Overpriced 
 
0 5 8 0 0 0 0 0 
 
13 -18 
 
3.1% -4.3% 
  
Underpriced 
 
0 0 0 0 38 46 36 14 
 
134 -27 
 
32.1% -6.5% 
                  
 
n = 3 Overpriced 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
0 -31 
 
0.0% -7.4% 
  
Underpriced 
 
0 0 0 0 16 41 9 21 
 
87 -74 
 
20.9% -17.7% 
                  
 
n = 4 Overpriced 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
0 -31 
 
0.0% -7.4% 
  
Underpriced 
 
4 0 0 0 0 24 1 20 
 
49 -112 
 
11.8% -26.9% 
                  
 
n = 5 Overpriced 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
0 -31 
 
0.0% -7.4% 
  
Underpriced 
 
4 2 0 0 0 0 0 25 
 
31 -130 
 
7.4% -31.2% 
                  
 
n = 6 Overpriced 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
0 -31 
 
0.0% -7.4% 
  
Underpriced 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 
 
18 -143 
 
4.3% -34.3% 
                  
                  Notes: A regression estimating Equation 3 is calculated for each week of the sample. The railways were defined as overpriced in a particular week if the railway dummy (𝛽3) was significantly greater than 
zero during that particular week, as this suggested the railways had a significantly higher share price/par ratio than non-railways, given their current and future dividends, during that week. Conversely, they 
were defined as underpriced in a particular week if the railway dummy was significantly less than zero during that week. The total weeks of overpricing and underpricing for each year were then calculated. 
P=Share Price, Z=Par Value, D=Dividend, R=Railway Dummy, B=Beta, S=Size. 
For week = t 
𝑃𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑍𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1
𝐷𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑍𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽2𝐸𝑡  ∆
𝐷𝑖 ,𝑡+𝑛
𝑍𝑖 ,𝑡+𝑛
 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝜀 
(3) 
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Table 6: Estimates of the Number of Weeks of Over and Under Pricing of Railway Shares between 1843 and 1850 using 
Railway Dummy from Dividend Yield regressions 
 
                  
 
No. of 
future 
changes in 
dividends 
included 
Overpriced or 
Underpriced 
 
1843 1844 1845 1846 1847 1848 1849 1850 
 
Total  
Relative to 
n=0 
 
Total  
(% of 
sample) 
Relative to 
n=0 (%  
of sample) 
                  
 
n = 0 Overpriced 
 
2 38 51 12 0 0 0 7 
 
110 - 
 
26.4% - 
  
Underpriced 
 
0 0 0 0 0 27 0 11 
 
38 - 
 
9.1% - 
                  
 
n = 1 Overpriced 
 
0 24 33 12 0 0 0 0 
 
69 -41 
 
16.5% -9.8% 
  
Underpriced 
 
0 0 0 0 0 17 0 0 
 
17 -21 
 
4.1% -5.0% 
                  
 
n = 2 Overpriced 
 
0 4 27 0 0 0 0 1 
 
32 -78 
 
7.7% -18.7% 
  
Underpriced 
 
0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 
 
6 -32 
 
1.4% -7.7% 
                  
 
n = 3 Overpriced 
 
0 0 1 0 0 0 6 0 
 
7 -103 
 
1.7% -24.7% 
  
Underpriced 
 
0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 
 
5 -33 
 
1.2% -7.9% 
                  
 
n = 4 Overpriced 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
0 -110 
 
0.0% -26.4% 
  
Underpriced 
 
1 0 0 0 0 2 3 5 
 
11 -27 
 
2.6% -6.5% 
                  
 
n = 5 Overpriced 
 
0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 
 
2 -108 
 
0.5% -25.9% 
  
Underpriced 
 
7 1 0 0 0 5 16 7 
 
36 -2 
 
8.6% -0.5% 
                  
 
n = 6 Overpriced 
 
0 0 5 2 0 0 0 0 
 
7 -103 
 
1.7% -24.7% 
  
Underpriced 
 
7 0 0 0 0 11 12 7 
 
37 -1 
 
8.9% -0.2% 
                  
                  Notes: A regression estimating Equation 4 is calculated for each week of the sample. The railways are estimated to be overpriced during a particular week when the railway dummy (𝛽2) is significantly less 
than zero, as this implies that railways had a significantly lower dividend yield than non-railways during that week, when future dividend growth is controlled for. Conversely they are estimated to be 
underpriced when the coefficient of the railways dummy was significantly higher than zero. The total weeks of overpricing and underpricing for each year were then calculated. P=Share Price, Z=Par Value, 
D=Dividend, R=Railway Dummy, B=Beta, S=Size. 
For week = t 
𝐷𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑃𝑖 ,𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑡  ∆
𝐷𝑖 ,𝑡+𝑛
𝑍𝑖 ,𝑡+𝑛
 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝜀 
(4) 
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Figure 1: Capital Gains Indices for Established Railways and Non-Railways, 
1843-50 
 
 
 
Notes: Source data for railway share prices from Railway Times (1843-50), and for non-railway share prices from 
Course of the Exchange (1843-50). Established railways index includes those railways which were operating before 
January 1843 for which share price and dividend data is available. Non-railways index includes the twenty largest 
non-railways by market capitalisation for which share price and dividend data is available. Capital gains for each 
company weighted by market capitalisation to produce market indices on a weekly basis. 
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Figure 2: Industry Dividend/Par Ratio Amongst Established Railways and 
Non-Railways, 1843-50 
 
 
 
Notes: Source data for both railway and non-railway dividends from Course of the Exchange (1843-50). Par value 
data for railways obtained from Railway Times (1843-50), and for non-railways from Course of the Exchange (1843-
50). Railway industry dividend/par ratio calculated as total dividends paid by established railway companies as a 
percentage of total par value of established railway companies for which share price and dividend data is available. 
Non-railway industry dividend/par ratio calculated as total dividends paid by non-railway companies as a percentage 
of total par value of non-railway companies for which share price and dividend data is available. 
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Figure 3: Industry Dividend Yield of Established Railways and Non-
Railways, 1843-50 
 
 
 
Notes: Source data for both railway and non-railway dividends from Course of the Exchange (1843-50). Share price 
data for railways obtained from Railway Times (1843-50), and for non-railways from Course of the Exchange (1843-
50). Railway industry dividend/price ratio calculated as total dividends paid by established railway companies as a 
percentage of total market capitalisation of established railway companies for which share price and dividend data is 
available. Non-railway industry dividend/price ratio calculated as total dividends paid by non-railway companies as a 
percentage of total market capitalisation of non-railway companies for which share price and dividend data is 
available. 
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Figure 4: Total Return Indices for Established Railways and Non-Railways, 
1843-50 
 
 
 
Notes: Source data for both railway and non-railway dividends from Course of the Exchange (1843-50). Share price 
data for railways obtained from Railway Times (1843-50), and for non-railways from Course of the Exchange (1843-
50). Half-yearly dividend assumed to be made in equal payments in each week. Total return, as measured by the sum 
of capital gains and dividends, for each company weighted by market capitalisation to produce market indices. 
Established railways index includes those railways which were operating before January 1843 for which share price 
and dividend data is available. Non-railways index includes the twenty largest non-railways by market capitalisation 
for which share price and dividend data is available. 
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Figure 5: Impact of Dividend Variable on Share Price Premium from Repeated Weekly Cross-sectional Regressions, 1843-50 
 
 
Panel A: Controlling for Beta, Size and Railway Dummy Panel B: Controlling for Beta, Size, Railway Dummy and Two Years 
of Dividend Growth 
  
 
 
 
Notes: A regression estimating Equation 1 is calculated for each week of the sample. Value of the coefficient 
represents the value of 𝛽1 from Equation 1 in any given week, with a 95 per cent confidence interval constructed 
using robust standard errors. P=Share Price, Z=Par Value, D=Dividend, R=Railway Dummy, B=Beta, S=Size. 
For week = t 
𝑃𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑍𝑖 ,𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1
𝐷𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑍𝑖 ,𝑡
+ 𝛽2𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝜀 
(1) 
 
Notes: A regression estimating Equation 3 is calculated for each week of the sample. Value of the coefficient 
represents the value of 𝛽1 from Equation 3 in any given week, with a 95 per cent confidence interval constructed 
using robust standard errors. P=Share Price, Z=Par Value, D=Dividend, R=Railway Dummy, B=Beta, S=Size. 
For week = t 
𝑃𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑍𝑖 ,𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1
𝐷𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑍𝑖 ,𝑡
+ 𝛽2𝐸𝑡  ∆
𝐷𝑖,𝑡+𝑛
𝑍𝑖,𝑡+𝑛
 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝜀 
(3) 
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Figure 6: Impact of Railway Dummy on Share Price Premium from Repeated Weekly Cross-sectional Regressions, 1843-50 
 
 
Panel A: Controlling for Current Dividend, Beta and Size Panel B: Controlling for Current Dividend, Two Years of Dividend 
Growth, Beta and Size 
  
 
 
 
Notes: A regression estimating Equation 1 is calculated for each week of the sample. Value of the coefficient 
represents the value of 𝛽2 from Equation 1 in any given week, with a 95 per cent confidence interval constructed 
using robust standard errors. P=Share Price, Z=Par Value, D=Dividend, R=Railway Dummy, B=Beta, S=Size. 
For week = t 
𝑃𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑍𝑖 ,𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1
𝐷𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑍𝑖 ,𝑡
+ 𝛽2𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝜀 
(1) 
 
Notes: A regression estimating Equation 3 is calculated for each week of the sample. Value of the coefficient 
represents the value of 𝛽3 from Equation 3 in any given week, with a 95 per cent confidence interval constructed 
using robust standard errors. P=Share Price, Z=Par Value, D=Dividend, R=Railway Dummy, B=Beta, S=Size. 
For week = t 
𝑃𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑍𝑖 ,𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1
𝐷𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑍𝑖 ,𝑡
+ 𝛽2𝐸𝑡  ∆
𝐷𝑖,𝑡+𝑛
𝑍𝑖,𝑡+𝑛
 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝜀 
(3) 
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Figure 7: Impact of Railway Dummy on Dividend Yield from Repeated Weekly Cross-sectional Regressions, 1843-50 
 
 
Panel A: Controlling for Beta and Size Panel B: Controlling for Two Years of Dividend Growth, 
Beta and Size 
  
 
 
 
Notes: A regression estimating Equation 2 is calculated for each week of the sample. Value of the coefficient 
represents the value of 𝛽1 from Equation 2 in any given week, with a 95 per cent confidence interval constructed 
using robust standard errors. P=Share Price, D=Dividend, R=Railway Dummy, B=Beta, S=Size. 
 
For week = t 
𝐷𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑃𝑖 ,𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝜀 
(2) 
 
 
Notes: A regression estimating Equation 4 is calculated for each week of the sample. Value of the coefficient 
represents the value of 𝛽2 from Equation 4 in any given week, with a 95 per cent confidence interval constructed 
using robust standard errors. P=Share Price, D=Dividend, Z=Par Value, R=Railway Dummy, B=Beta, S=Size. 
 
For week = t 
𝐷𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑃𝑖 ,𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑡  ∆
𝐷𝑖 ,𝑡+𝑛
𝑍𝑖 ,𝑡+𝑛
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(4) 
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Figure 8: Correlation between Dividend Yield and Dividend Growth during the Next 
Six Months, using One Observation per Company Every Sixth Months 
 
 
 
Notes: Correlation coefficient = -0.491. Source data for both railway and non-railway dividends from Course of the 
Exchange (1843-50). Share price data for railways obtained from Railway Times (1843-50), and for non-railways 
from Course of the Exchange (1843-50). One observation shown per company at end of June and end of December in 
each year between 1843 and 1850. Dividend Yield calculated as Dividend Per Share/Share Price. Change in 6 month 
Dividend/Par ratio calculated as difference between Dividend/Par ratio at time t and time t+6 months. 
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